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hilosophy, particularly the discipline of metaphysics,
has long concerned itself with the problem of causation.
Though the nature of causation may seem intuitively
obvious or axiomatic, it is precisely due to these impressions that it deserves deep philosophical investigation. There
is never any doubt that causation exists in some way (that is, hat
events somehow ’lead’ to other events). However, what exactly is
meant by saying “A causes B” is not so clear. The difficulty of
this question becomes more evident when one looks at the long
string of illustrious philosophers who have attempted its solution – from David Hume’s anti-realist regularity theory of causation, 1 to John Mackie’s more elaborate explanation 2 in a similar
tradition. The most recent of these propositions, and one that has
proven particularly influential, is David Lewis’s theory of possible worlds. 3
This paper will analyze Lewis’s view, examining both its advantages and its flaws. It will examine the viability of the entire
“possible worlds” enterprise, looking at two traditional critiques
of this approach as well as a more original argument. Of particular interest will be the phenomenon of preemption and the problems this phenomenon presents for Lewis’s view. Though preRoman Feiman will graduate from the University of Toronto this spring, with
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emption has long been problematic for many theories of causation, it will be argued here that the issue is in fact much less serious than it appears, not only for Lewis’s account, but for all others as well. Finally, the viability of Lewis’s theory will be examined in light of both its flaws and advantages.
In David Lewis’s account, a statement of causation is similar
to a counterfactual statement. 4 Saying “A caused B” is thus
much like saying “If A had occurred, B would have occurred
also, and if A had not occurred, then B would not have occurred.” It is important to note the difference between counterfactual conditional statements and material conditional statements, which are usually of the form “If A, then B.” In a material
conditional, B is true only if A is, and to check whether A is true
one need only compare its claim to the state of the world. Counterfactuals have a different nature – rather than making claims
about what is, counterfactuals concern themselves with what
could be. So if A were true, what would be the consequences for
B? Here, a problem quickly arises. How can one check the validity of any given counterfactual conditional? A brief illustration:
while the truth of the material conditional, “If Jimmy drove, he
crashed his car” is easy to check through reference to real events,
how would one check the counterfactual, “If Jimmy had driven,
he would have crashed his car?” Since this statement does not
concern what actually happened, its validity cannot be determined by reference to any real event. Rather, information might
be required on how safe Jimmy’s driving is generally, what car
he drives, the road conditions and, in fact, an infinite number of
other factors.
It seems, therefore, that any theory that uses counterfactuals
requires some scheme by which their validity can be determined.
Lewis was aware of this issue and proposed a solution that
serves as the basis for his theory – the idea of possible worlds.
The claim is that our universe is only one of an infinite number
of possible worlds, and that each of these worlds is different in
some respect; anything from a minor detail such as the color of a
given chair, to things as drastic as the laws of physics. In fact, the
only laws that all possible worlds must follow are the laws of
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logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, which says that no
proposition can be both true and false. Using this idea, Lewis
claims that in order to check whether a counterfactual conditional is true, one must simply look at the nearest possible world
in which the prerequisite condition (called “A” above) holds. The
nearest possible world is one in which as many aspects of the
world as possible are similar to ours. So if A is true in our world,
then ours is the nearest possible world required. If A does not
hold, then by definition the possible world of interest is the one
where absolutely everything is identical to our world, except that
A holds. For instance, if a counterfactual is concerned with a specific red chair being blue, then the nearest possible world that
must be examined is the one where that chair indeed happens to
be blue, but everything else is unchanged from our world. Lewis
proposes that in this nearest possible world it is possible to turn
the original counterfactual claim of interest into a material conditional claim; that is, since A is true in this world of interest, we
should check if B is also true. If that is the case, then the material
conditional holds in this possible world, which logically implies
that the original counterfactual holds in ours.
Causation is, in fact, a bit more complicated. To claim that
event A caused event B, one must first validate the corresponding counterfactual (what Lewis calls “causal dependence”), but
there also must be a chain of events of any length, termed a
“causal chain,” leading from event A to event B, with every
event causally dependant on its predecessor. With this scheme, it
is worth noting that while causal dependence is sufficient for
causation (by definition, it is simply a causal chain with two
members), causation is not simply causal dependence. This is
because causation is a transitive relationship (A can cause B, can
cause C, etc.) while causal dependence is not.
While this approach may seem promising, it is not without its
flaws. The most obvious argument that can be leveled at the possible worlds theory is that it is too demanding, metaphysically.
This argument is something of a reductio ad absurdum – the kind
of use of possible worlds that Lewis proposes implies that they
exist, a notion that is absurd and impossible. After all, if one ac-
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cepts the existence of infinite possible worlds somewhere in the
realm of reality, one might as well accept ghosts, witches or any
other number of potentially convenient explanatory agents that
cannot be shown to exist. This argument is even more cogent
given Lewis’s conviction that possible worlds are in fact real entities, 5 to the point that we are only one of these worlds, such that
a person in another possible world considering us is no less real
than we are while considering that person’s possible world.
However, if one rejects this belief, there does not appear to be
any reason to be convinced by the above criticism. Though it
may seem devastating at first to Lewis’s theory to reject the idea
that possible worlds are real entities in the physical non-abstract
sense in which Lewis views them, this is not the case. After all,
convenient logical devices are commonly used without any need
to establish a physical existence. One obvious example comes
from our use of numbers. Though whether abstract objects such
as numbers are in some sense “real” is still an ongoing debate,
there is no doubt that numbers are not physical entities in the
sense that possible worlds are claimed to be. Nevertheless, and
regardless of whether they are real or not, it is difficult to deny
their theoretical usefulness. In a similar way, there is no need to
claim that possible worlds exist as physical entities in order to
employ them for testing counterfactuals. Granting possible
worlds the same ontological status as abstract objects seems
more than sufficient.
Another issue that has long been used to challenge most
theories of causation is the question of preemption. 6 Preemption
occurs when some event A causes event B, but if A had not
caused event B, then some event A-2 would have caused B. The
issue for Lewis’s approach arises from his use of counterfactuals
in the concept of causal dependence. If B would have occurred
regardless of A, then it would seem that A did not cause B because one of the two conditions of Lewis’s causal dependence
does not hold. If A had not occurred, then B still would have occurred.
However, there is a problem with the idea of preemption,
and with the criticism it implies: is the B that occurs due to A the
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same as that B that would have occurred due to A-2? An example
will illustrate the issue. If Jimmy crashes his car (B) because he
falls asleep at the wheel (A), but he would have crashed anyway
because of black ice up ahead (A-2), there is an important sense in
which the two crashes would not be identical, with respect to
what the car hits, at what time, at what angle, etc. In fact, the two
crashes would not be the same event at all. In this way, the argument of preemption seems to employ a sort of philosophical
cheating. In a more rigorous and accurate way, preemption can
be rephrased using the type/token distinction. Type of events B,
such as “crashing the car,” are indeed subject to preemption, but
these are not a problem for Lewis. However, two token (specific)
events can never be identical to each other, so that the same token of event can never have two causes such as in the above example. Preemption is thus a flawed argument, not only against
Lewis’s explanation of causation, but against all others as well.
There is, however, one criticism of the possible worlds approach that is, perhaps, a little more original and cannot be dismissed as easily as the two objections above. While possible
worlds do indeed seem to be a method of truth evaluation for
counterfactual conditionals, it is worth examining precisely how
this is achieved. In the example above, “If Jimmy had driven, he
would have crashed his car,” we may check the validity of this
statement using possible worlds. Assuming Jimmy did not drive
(or crash his car) in our world, we take the nearest possible
world – one in which Jimmy did indeed drive. Now, according
to Lewis’s method we check whether Jimmy indeed crashed his
car in this world. But here lies the problem, for there does not
seem to be any easy way to decide whether this is true. In fact, it
appears once again that we must rely on factors such as Jimmy’s
driving record, road conditions, etc. Though things have become
more complicated, we are back to using our intuitions regarding
causation. Though intuition is a useful tool in philosophy, and
one against which many theories and views can be tested, it is
not at all helpful here – rather, determining a causal link using
intuition is precisely what we sought to avoid. Lewis’s entire
proposal can be viewed as an attempt to remove ourselves from
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intuition by finding a more formal, less subjective way to determine the presence of causation. Indeed, worse than making no
progress, it seems that the possible worlds proposal actively hinders the effort. Starting from intuitions about causation, an entire
complex proposal that is explanatorily and perhaps metaphysically demanding has been built, only to find that in the end it relies on precisely the same intuition to make the final judgment
call. This critique appears devastating unless some response to it
can be found.
Lewis’s proposal, while flawed, is not doomed. Though it
may seem from the critiques above that possible worlds overcomplicate the situation without moving past the use of intuition, it must be noted that causal dependence and causal chains
are valuable insights, especially once the criticism from preemption is dismissed. In fact, the entire proposal could still be rescued with some suggestion of a way to move from our intuitions
to a more mechanized explanation of causation once Lewis’s
paradigm has been employed and a nearest possible world
found. Until such time, however, it appears that while it is an
interesting suggestion, this account of causation does not advance our understanding of the phenomenon significantly. Causation proves once again to be a slippery philosophical opponent, and much remains to be investigated.
NOTES
See Hume, Inquiries concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals..
2 See Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation.
3 See Lewis, "Causation,” 556-67; and Lewis, "Counterfactuals
and Comparative Possibility," 418-46.
4 Lewis, Counterfactuals,1-3.
5 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 1 – 92.
6 Lewis, "Causation,” 556-67.
1
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